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POINTS OF LAW OR FACT WHICH THE PETITIONER 
CLAIMS THE COURT HAS OVERLOOKED, MISAPPRE-
HENDED OR MISAPPLIED (URAP Rule 35) 
I. The Per Curiam Decision overlooks, misapprehends or 
misapplies the court(s) function regarding entrapment. 
II. The Per Curiam Decision overlooks, misapprehends or 
misapplies the old 1978 Utah case of State v. Boone, 581 P.2d 
571 in view of the Legislative 1980 superceding Statute 77-23a-l, 
et al., Interception of Communication Act. 
III. The Per Curiam Decision overlooks or misapprehends 
Dr. Erickson!s Due Process Constitutional rights under the 4th 
and 14th Amendments and the Utah Constitution, Article I Sec. 14. 
IV. The Per Curiam Decision, citing and relying on U.S. v. 
Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, is misapprehended or misplaced because 
Caceres deals with the IRS Manual, Regulations and Rules, not 
with mandatory Statutes. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OVERLOOKS, MISAPPREHENDS 
OR MISAPPLIES THE COURT(S) FUNCTION 
REGARDING ENTRAPMENT 
If there is an iota of evidence linked to or showing 
entrapment, this defense is established as a matter of law, 
"The criminal conduct charged against the defendant being the 
product of the creative activity of law-enforcement officials," 
Sherman v. U.S., 2 L.Ed.2d 848; the jury conviction was reversed; 
with instructions to dismiss the indictment. * * * "We are not 
choosing between conflicting witnesses, nor judging credibility" 
* * *, p. 851. "Areas of impermissible police conduct, is appro-
priate for the court and not the jury * * * the court alone * * * 
no matter by whom or at what stage of the proceedings the facts 
are brought to its attention * * * a jury verdict * * * cannot 
give significant guidelines * * * Only the court * * * can do 
this * * *," p. 858. The Per Curiam Decision overlooks this law 
function solely reserved to the court (s). 
Testimony not rebutted 
The first time Officer Paquette ever saw Dr. Erickson was 
in his Office on the morning of May 24, and "she walked back to 
the lab room and started talking to Dr. Erickson." (R 324; 523) 
"I was cleaning my instruments, and all of a sudden she was there 
talking to me." (R 337; 543) Dr. Erickson testified, "I didn't 
like the situation, so I told Ladeena (the Receptionist) to have 
her come back when I figured we would be gone." (R 339) Ladeena 
testified, "he said let's tell her to come back around 7:00. We 
knew we'd be done about a quarter after 6:00." (R 32 5) Dr. 
Erickson tried to "evade Kris Gordon." (R 525) After the Dental 
Office was closed and locked, about 6:00 p.m., on May 24, Dr. 
Erickson was at his motorcycle putting "his helmet on to leave," 
when Kris Gordon walked up. (R 527; 325). Paquette testified 
that she would contact the Doctor on Friday, May 31. (R 305) 
Matter of law 
As a matter of law, the persistent criminal conduct tactics 
were the product of law officers. State v. Martin, 713 P.2d 60. 
The trial court erred in not granting the motion to suppress and 
dismiss (R 16; 19) and erred in failing to grant the motion for 
a new trial (R 214) and erred in failing to grant the motion to 
arrest judgment (R 197-206); and this court misapprehends in the 
Decision, "We cannot say that defendant was entrapped as a matter 
of law." 
Further argument 
Even though the Officers testified they had an informant, 
(1) no informant was produced or testified, and (2) Officer 
Paquette was asked, "Do you know anyone in the last 14-15 years 
that Dr. Erickson sold drugs to? * * * A. Other than myself, 
no." (R 426). Prior to June 3, 1985, Dr. Erickson had (3) never 
been charged with any felony, (R 33 2) (4) never been charged by 
the Dental Association, (5) never been charged or reprimanded 
by the Board of Regulations (R 536), and (6) never been charged 
with selling any type of drugs. (R 332) 
There is no evidence that Dr. Erickson was engaged in any 
criminal activity or predisposed to commit a crime, prior to the 
Dental Office visits by undercover agent Officer Paquette, using 
the assumed name of Kris Gordon. In State v. Kourbelas (Utah), 
621 P. 2d 1238, the conviction was reversed; "There is no evi-
dence that defendant has previously possessed or dealt in the 
drug•" 
Officer Paquette came up with "some plan" to see if "I 
could purchase some narcotic drugs." (R 285-286) She had 
never seen Dr. Erickson prior to May 24, 1985 in his dental 
chair. (R 298} 383) At no time did Dr. Erickson ever call or 
try to reach her. She went to the Dental Office (R 286; 357-
359; 378) acting pretty nervous and picking at her fingernails, 
just kind of jumping around. (R 328; 520) While in the dental 
chair, "I stated that I didn!t have a problem with my teeth, 
that I just wanted to talk to the Doctor * * *." (R 286; 359) 
"I really didn't want any dental work done. I wanted to see if 
he would sell me drugs." (R 359-360) "My intention was to see 
if he would sell me narcotic drugs." (R 378) "Legally from my 
point of view, to buy drugs, to make a case to buy drugs." 
(R 381) Her primary objective was "to buy a narcotic drug." 
(R 298; 398; 402; 422-23) Kris Gordon took her roommate with 
her for the first visit on May 24 * * * "She just came along to 
make it look good * * * look normal, just kind of prop." (R 302) 
"The scenario that we wanted to provide is was that she was an 
amphetamine addict and not looking for legitimate dental work," 
as testified to by Agent Mayo, and that her initial visit was 
"to obtain a prescription or drugs outside the realm of profes-
sional services rendered by a dentist." (R 450) 
A casual reading of the Transcript (R 279-573) shows 
that the Trial Court and the Decision overlook the totality 
of the circumstances of the law-enforcement officials planning, 
designing and creating the scenario for the commission of a 
crime by Dr. Erickson, a person in bankruptcy. "We conclude 
from the evidence that entrapment was established as a matter 
of law/1 Sherman, supra 851. 
POINT II 
THE PER CURIAM DECISION OVERLOOKS, MIS-
APPREHENDS OR MISAPPLIES THE OLD 1978 
UTAH CASE OF STATE V. BOONE, 581 P.2d 
571 IN VIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE 1980 SUPER-
CEDING STATUTE 77-23a-l, ET AL., INTER-
CEPTION OF COMMUNICATION ACT 
Boone, supra, must yield to and is subordinate to the manda-
tory intent of the Legislature in 77-23a-l, et al, which defines 
the circumstances and conditions under which law-enforcement 
officials must proceed and operate, specifically apply and pro-
cure from a Utah State District Court Judge an Order authorizing 
or approving the interception of wire or oral communications 
(between Dr. Erickson and Officer Paquette) 77-23a-8. 
The Decision misapprehends or misapplies and cites and 
relies on 77-23a-4(2)(b). This Section only relieves law-enforce-
ment officials and others similarly situated from "a felony of 
the third degree," 77-23a-4(l). Officer Paquette was unlawfully 
"wired" when in the Dental Office. 77-23a-8 mandates "wire" 
procedure for law-enforcement officials. 77-23a-7 mandates the 
exclusionary rule. 
All procedure and evidence gathered by the Officers was 
tainted prior to and on May 24 through June 3—the arrest, and 
should be suppressed with the charges dismissed as a matter of 
law. 
POINT III 
THE DECISION OVERLOOKS OR MISAPPREHENDS 
DR. ERICKSON'S DUE PROCESS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS UNDER THE 4th AND 14th AMENDMENTS 
AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14. 
There were no exigent circumstances involved here. State 
v. Christensen, 676 P.2d, at 408 (Utah 1984) provides, "Warrant-
less searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent 
circumstances require action before a warrant can be obtained," 
citing Katz v. U.S., 19 L.Ed.2d 576. A "Judicial Order could 
have accommodated the legitimate needs of law enforcement," 
Katz 585. "The 4th Amendment protects people not places, Katz, 
582. Katz ruled that electronic eaves dropping complies with 
the standard of the 4th Amendment only when authorized by a 
neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable cause and under 
precise limits and appropriate safeguards, and that the fruits 
of such surveillance conducted without such judicial authoriza-
tion are inadmissible as evidence at trial. The 4th Amendment's 
right of privacy is enforceable against the States through the 
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
642. The basic purpose of the 4th Amendment, basic to a free 
society, "is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals 
against arbitrary invasions by government officials11 * * * Berger 
v. N.Y., 18 L.Ed.2d at 1049. 
Dr. Erickson was a law-abiding citizen and entitled to be 
left alone by the law-enforcement officials and he was and is 
entitled to the safeguards of the 4th Amendment against arbitrary 
invasions by government officials. 
The 4th Amendment is to prevent unlawful police action, 
Steagald v. U.S., 68 L.Ed.2d 38. 
Based upon the fundamental fairness of the Due Process 
Clauses of the 4th and 14th Amendments and Article I Section 14, 
Constitution of Utah, the Constitutions call for a viewing of 
the entire Record herein for the totality of the circumstances 
of the unlawful police activity and as a matter of law, reversing 
the conviction and setting aside the charges. 
POINT IV 
THE PERCURIAM DECISION, CITING AND RELYING 
ON U.S. v. CACERES, 440 U.S. 741, is MIS-
APPREHENDED OR MISPLACED BECAUSE CACERES 
DEALS WITH THE IRS MANUAL, REGULATIONS AND 
RULES, NOT WITH MANDATORY STATUTES. 
In Caceres, * * * "The agency was not required by the Con-
stitution or by Statute to adopt any particular procedure or 
rules before engaging in consensual monitoring and recording." 
Caceres deals with the IRS Manual and IRS violation of its own 
Regulations and Rules. 
The present case deals with a mandatory Utah Statute, 
Interception of Communication Act, 77-23a-l, et al. The Record 
shows that the law-enforcement officials ignored 77-23a-8 by 
failing to apply to, and procure an Order from, a Utah State 
District Court Judge for Officer Paquette to be "wired11 when in 
the Dental Office- Dr. Erickson did not know that Officer 
Paquette was "wired11 when in his Office. (R 3 34) 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court erred in matters of law in failing 
to grant the Motion to Suppress (R 16) and Motion to Dismiss 
(R 19) or Motion for Directed Verdict (R 517) or Motion to Arrest 
Judgment and enter Judgment of Acquittal (R 197-206) and in 
Sentencing defendant (R 210) based upon illegal and totally 
tainted evidence, this Petition for Rehearing in banc should be 
granted and the case placed on the calendar for oral argument. 
* * * "On legal issues we do not defer to the trial courts' 
ruling; our function is to determine that proper standards were 
applied." * * * Gillmor v. Gillmor (Utah), 657 P. 2d at 739. 
This Petition for Rehearing should be granted because the 
Per Curiam Decision overlooks or misapprehends (1) entrapment, 
(2) mandatory Utah statutes, (3) the function of the court(s) in 
matters of law, and (4) cites and relies on (a) the obsolete 
Boone case, (b) 77-23a-4(2) (b) and the Caceres case which are of 
no force and effect here. 
Interpretation of a Statute must be based on the language 
used, and courts have no power to rewrite a Statute to make it 
conform to an intention not expressed. Mtn. States Tel. and Tel 
v. P.S.C. (Utah) 155 P.2d 184. The determination of the intent 
of the Legislature is a question of law for the court. Henrie 
v. Rocky Mtn. Packing Co. (Utah), 202 P.2d 727. The Intercep-
tion of Communications Act, 77-23a-l, et al. should be read and 
interpreted in its fullness. The penalty provision 77-23a-4 
cannot supercede the mandatory procedural provision 77-23a-8 
and the mandatory exclusionary rule 77-23a-7. 
Dr. Erickson's material and substantial rights are affected 
by the Decision's oversights and misapprehensions. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, No. 21055 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
F I L E D 
v . J u n e 1 7 , 198 6 
Verd J. Erickson, 
Defendant and Appellant. Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant was charged under U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) with unlawful distribution for value of a 
controlled substance. A jury found him guilty as charged, and 
he was sentenced and placed on conditional probation. As 
points on appeal, he contends (1) that he was entrapped, and 
(2) that certain evidence used against him should have been 
suppressed. 
Defendant is a dentist who practiced in Salt Lake 
County. In May 1985, the Metro Narcotics Strike Force received 
information that defendant, was..overpresojribing or distributing 
pharmaceutical drugs to patients illegally. Undercover agent 
Celeste Paguette was asked to assist with the investigation. 
Ms. Paguette called defendant's office and made an appointment 
for May 24, 1985, in the assumed name of Kris Gordon. When she 
arrived for her appointment, Paguette filled out the requested 
forms and was seated in the dental chair. She immediately 
informed defendant that she did not have.a problem with her 
teeth but was concerned about the effects her ingestion of 
"speed" (amphetamines) was having on them. After defendant had 
examined her teeth, Paguette again asked if speed is destructive 
to the teeth. Defendant responded by saying that amphetamines 
purchased from a pharmacist would probably be less harmful than 
those purchased on the street. Paguette indicated that she did 
not know a doctor who would write her a prescription. Defendant 
explained that he could write prescriptions but that he disliked 
doing so because they left a "paper trail." Nevertheless, he said 
he would consider it and asked Paguette to return at 5:00 p.m. 
When she went back to the office at 5:00 p.m., the 
receptionist said the doctor was still working on a patient and 
asked Paguette to return at 6:00 p.m. Paguette returned later 
as requested and talked with defendant. He asked what she would 
be interested in. She reminded him that he had said he could 
write a prescription for an amphetamine. Defendant said he did 
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thirty amphetamine pills from a small bottle. He said he wanted 
street value for the drugs and exchanged them for $60 in cash 
offered by Paquette. Defendant stated that he would not be 
back to the office until the following Friday (May 31) and that 
if Paquette wanted more of the drugs, they could talk then. 
On May 31, Paquette went to the office at about 
5:00 p.m. and was again asked to return at 6:00 p.m. When she 
returned, she met with defendant and he asked how she liked the 
pills she had purchased previously. They then negotiated a 
larger transaction: 1,000 amphetamine pills and 3 00 doses of 
liquid "demerol" (meperidine) for $5,000. He also asked 
whether she would be interested in purchasing some valium. 
Paquette said she did not use that drug, but she would check 
with her friends to see if they were interested. Defendant 
suggested that she come to the office on Monday, June 3, on the 
pretense that she was there to have her teeth cleaned. On that 
appointment, Paquette told defendant her friends were not 
interested in the valium, but she had the money for the 
amphetamines and demerol. Defendant told her to return to the 
office at 6:00 p.m. When Paquette returned at that time, de-
fendant exchanged the amphetamines and demerol for $5,000 in 
cash. On this occasion (and during most of her earlier visits 
to the office), Paquette wore a "wire" which transmitted her 
conversations to fellow narcotics officers stationed outside. 
When the transaction was completed, approximately eight 
officers entered the office and arrested defendant. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss 
the charges against him on—the- ground of entrapment. He also 
filed a motion to suppress all physical evidence seized in the 
course of the investigation and to suppress all statements 
elicited from defendant. After an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that defendant 
was not entrapped as a matter of law. The court granted, in 
part, the motion to suppress, but ruled admissible the evidence 
received by Paquette. 
At trial, the issue of entrapment was put to the 
jury. Paquette testified that her primary purpose in 
approaching defendant was to attempt to purchase drugs. De-
fendant admitted that he sold Paquette the drugs and explained 
that he had done so because of financial difficulties. The 
jury found defendant to be guilty as charged. 
On appeal, defendant contends that he was entrapped 
as a matter of law. The entrapment statute, U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 76-2-303(1), provides as follows: 
It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting in 
co-operation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to obtain 
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evjLvaeuue ot tne commission ror prosecution 
by methods creating a substantial risk that 
the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it* Conduct 
merely affording a person an opportunity to 
commit an offense does not constitute 
entrapment. 
In State v. Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979), we held that 
this statute adopted the objective standard of determining 
entrapment. This standard focuses solely on the fairness of 
police conduct (as opposed to the predisposition of a defendant 
to commit a crime). We have reversed convictions under this 
section where the police have taken unfair advantage by using 
"personalized high-pressure tactics or appeals to extreme vul-
nerability." State v. Martin, Utah, 713 P.2d 60, 62 (1986). 
In the instant case, Paguette had no personal relationship with 
defendant. The investigation was commenced when the police 
received a report of an informant that defendant might be in-
volved in illegally distributing drugs to his patients. On her 
initial meeting with defendant, Paguette pointedly asked If de-
fendant could furnish her with drugs. Although she returned to 
defendant's office on several occasions, the visits were either 
at his invitation or with his consent. Under those circum-
stances, we cannot say that defendant was entrapped as a matter 
of law. 
Defendant next contends that the evidence obtained 
through electronic surveillance should have been suppressed. 
He contends that the recorded conversations between him and 
Paguette should not have been*^admitted-because she did-not-give 
him a Miranda warning before conversing with him. A defendant 
is not entitled to such a warning until custodial interrogation 
has commenced. State v. Kelly, 3 3 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (1986) ; 
State v. Benson, Utah, 712 P.2d 256 (1985). In the instant 
case, defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation 
until after his arrest. Defendant also challenges the admissi-
bility of the recorded conversations on.the ground that the 
police did not first obtain a court order authorizing the inter-
ception of the conversations. No such order was necessary since 
U.C.A., 1953, § 77-23a-4(2)(b) allows the interception of wire 
or oral communication by a person acting under color of law 
"where that person is a party to the communication'." See 
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); State v. Boone, 
Utah, 581 P.2d 571 (1978). 
Defendant also urges that the trial court erroneously 
refused to suppress the test results on the drugs involved since 
the police needed a search warrant to have the seized drugs tested. 
We do not address the merits of this contention since defendant 
never objected, either in his pretrial'motion to suppress or at 
trial, to the introduction of the test results. Although he did 
raise the issue in post-trial motions, this did not preserve the 
point for appeal. See State v. Heaps, Utah, 711 P.2d 257 (1985). 
The conviction is affirmed. 
